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[Crim. No. 10425. In Bank. Apr. 27,1967.] 
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. WILLIAM 
BANDHAUEH, Defendant and Appellant. 
[1] .Homicide - Evidence - Manslaughter: Instructions - Man-
sla.ughter. - The evidence did not support a manslaughter 
instruction based on homicide committed during heat of 
passion or a sudden quarrel where it was shown that defend-
ant and the victim met in a tavern, which they left together in 
a car driven by defendant, that the victim. was drunk and was 
refused drinks at a few bars, that defendant drank beer but 
did not appear intoxicated, that he was seen with the victim 
about an hour before the victim, was discovered shot a few 
blocks from the abandoned car, that defendant's footprints fit 
those near the victim's body and his fingerprints were identi-
cal with those in the car, that bullets from defendant's gun 
killed the victim, that the victim's wallet was found empty 
and defendant had about the same amount of money the 
victim had previously had, and that the car keys and keys for 
the victim's truck were found in defendant's motel room. 
[2] Id.-Evidence-Manslaughter: Instructions-Manslaughter;~­
The record did not support defendant's claim that he was 
sufficiently intoxicated to lack the malice necessary to consti-
tute murder and therefore entitled to a voluntary manslaugh-
McK. Dig. References: [1] Homicide, §§ 148, 190(2); [2] 
Homicide, §§ 148, 190; [3] Homicide, § 105; [4] Criminal Law, 
§211; [5] Criminal Law, §617(1); [6, 7, 9] Criminal Law, 
§ 1011(3); [8] Criminal Lnw, ~§ 587, 1011(3); [10] Jury, § 44. 
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ter instruction on the theory of diminished capacity where it 
appeared that during the evening with defendant the victim 
was refused drinks because of his apparent intoxication but 
that defendant was not, that defendant did not appear to be 
intoxicated during the six hours he was seen at various bars 
with the victim, and that defendant was not seen to have had 
more than six or seven beers during that time. 
[S] ld.-Evidence--Other Crimes.-In a prosecution for murder, 
the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence 
that defendant had stolen license plates and the car in which 
he drove the victim, where the evidence supported the prosecu-
tion's theory of robbery murder by indicating a plan to use a 
stolen vehicle to commit robberies. 
[4] Oriminal Law - Plea - Withdrawal. - The trial court could 
properly assume that defendant's decision, arrived at with the 
advice of counsel, to withdraw his plea of not guilty by reason 
of insanity, was intelligently and voluntarily made where 
defendant had a psychiatric examination that his counsel had 
arranged. 
[5] ld.-Argument of Oounsel-Scope of Ooncluding Argument.-
Counsel may vigorously argue his case and is not limited to 
"Chesterfieldian politeness," but he cannot overreach by stat-
ing his personal belief based on facts not in evidence. 
[6a,6b] ld.-Procedure to Determine Penalty-Argument.-In the 
penalty phase of a murder trial, the prosecutor's argument on 
his public responsibility was not, by itself, subject to objec-
tion where he stated that he was running for office, that he 
bore a public officer's mantle of trust requiring him to be fair, 
and that he had objected to certain evidence, indicating that it 
might be damaging to defendant. 
[7a, 7b] ld.-Procedure to Determine Penalty-Argument.-In the 
penalty phase of a murder trial, where testimonial statements 
by the prosecutor were injected gradually into the argument 
so that it was not until he asserted that he had seldom seen a 
more depraved character that grounds for objection were 
apparent, it was then too late to cure the error by admonition 
and any effort of the prosecutor to cure the error by formal 
retraction would have compounded it; under these circum-
stances, defendant was not precluded from raising the issue 
for the first time on appeal. 
[8] ld.-Argument of Oounsel: Procedure to Determine Penalty-
Argument.-At a trial on the issue of guilt, the prosecutor's 
[4] See Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 258; Am.Jur.2d, Criminal 
Law, § 508. 
[6] See Oal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, §§ 251, 254; Am.Jur.2d, Crimi-
nal Law, §§ 583, 586. 
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burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt justifies his 
closing the argument as well as opening it; at the penalty 
trial, however, neither side has the burden to prove that one 
or the other penalty is proper and there is no logical reason to 
favor one side over the other in argument. Equal opportunity 
to argue - is also consistent with the Legislature's strict 
neutrality in governing the jury's choice of penalty. 
[9] ld.-Procedure to Determine Penalty-Argument.-Scrupulous 
regard for complete impartiality and fairness dictates that the 
extent of argument on each side at a penalty trial should be 
equal; each side should have an opportunity to rebut the 
other's argument. Accordingly, the prosecution should open and 
the defense respond; the prosecution may then argue in rebut-
tal and the defense close in surrebuttal. 
[10] Jury-Qualification-Scruples Against Capital Punishment.-
A juror's mere doubts with respect to the death penalty are 
not sufficient to disqualify him so long as he conscientiously 
believes that he could return a death penalty verdict in a 
proper case. What constitutes a proper case is for the juror to 
decide. 
APPEAL, automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239, 
subd. (b), from a judgment of the Superior C.ourt of River-
side CoUnty. John Neblett, Judge. Reversed in part and 
affirmed in part. 
Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction of first 
degree murder reversed insofar as it relates to penalty and 
affirmed in all other respects. 
Herbert E. Selwyn, under appointment by the Supreme 
Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, William E. James, 
Assistant Attorney General, and S. Clark Moore, Deputy 
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-A jury convicted defendant William 
Bandhauer of first degree murder of Walter Ashley Smith 
and fixed the penalty at death. This appeal is automatic. (Pen. 
Code, § 1239, subd. (b).) 
[1] Defendant met Smith at Thelma's Tavern in River-
side at approximately 8 p.m. on February 25, 1966. He intro-
duced himself as Mike to Smith's friend, Gerald Allen 
Thomas, and drank beer with Smith and played pool with 
him. The three men left Thelma's Tavern in a blue Ford 
I 
! 
Apr. 1967] PEOPLE V. BANDHAUER 
(66 C.2d 524; 58 Cal.Rptr. 332, 426 P.2d 900] 
527 
station wagon driven by defendant. Smith was drunk and was 
refused drinks at a few bars. Defendant did not appear 
intoxicated although he was seen drinking beer. When the last 
bar was closing at 2 a.m., Thomas found that defendant and 
Smith had left without him while he was playing pool. He 
had last seen them together at 1 :20 a.m. 
Defendant was next seen at 4 :30 a.m. on the 26th when he 
rented a room at the Wagon \Vheel Motel. He arrived without 
a car and told the manager that his car had broken down on 
the freeway. He did not appear drunk, although he looked 
tired and dirty. He gave a fictitious name and left at 
9 :30 a.m. 
An engineer on a passing train saw Smith's body on the 
railroad right-of-way near Myers Street in Arlington at 2 a.m. 
that morning. Police officers arrived about 2 :30 a.m. and 
found that Smith had been shot six times. They found a .22 
caliber shell casing near the body and footprints around it 
and in the vicinity. There was no money in Smith's wallet, 
although he had approximately $75 in cash the previous 
morning. A few streets away the officers found a blue Ford 
station wagon abandoned in a ditch, and in the station wagon 
they found expended and live shells and a license plate. They 
removed fingerprints from the car and placed them on 
cards. 
About 11 :45 a.m. on February 26, 1966, a police officer, who 
had been given a description of defendant as a murder 
suspect, saw him on the street. He stopped defendant and 
asked if he had any identification. Defendant produced a 
receipt for rent paid by Paul L. Moslands. The officer 
searched defendant and found a .22 caliber revolver and Jivp 
ammunition and approximately $75 in cash. The officer told 
defendant that he was being arrested on suspicion of 
murder. 
Defendant's footprints fit those near Smith's body, and his 
fingerprints were identical with those taken from the station 
wagon. The bullets that killed Smith were fired from the gun 
taken from defendant. 
Police officers searched defendant's room at the Wagon 
Wheel Motel and found keys that fit the station wagon and 
also keys that fit a pickup truck owned by Smith. 
Defendant pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of 
insanity but later withdrew the plea of not guilty by reason 
of insanity. He did not offer any evidence at the trial on the 
issue of guilt but attempted to rebut by cross-examination and 
) 
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closing argument inferences drawn from the eviden,ce by the 
prosecution. 
Defendant contends that the trial court's refusal to give 
any instruc~ion as to voluntary manslaughter was reversible 
error. There is no evidence that would support a man-
slaughter instruction based on the theory of homicide commit-
ted during the heat of passion or during a sudden quarrel. 
[2] Defendant asserts, however, that there was evidence that 
he was sufficiently intoxicated to lack the malice necessary to 
constitute murder, and therefore he was entitled to a volun-
tary manslaughter instruction on the theory of diminished 
capacity. (See People v. Conley, 64 Cal.2d 310, 319 [49 Cal. 
Rptr. 815, 411 P.2d 911].) 
The record does not support this contention. Although 
Smith was refused drinks during the evening because of his 
apparent ,intoxication, defendant was not. He was not seen to 
have had more than six or seven beers during the six hours he 
was at various bars between 8 p.m. and 2 a.m., and he did not 
appear to be intoxicated. There is no evidence that his "drink-
ing had any substantial e1fect on him, or that he was so 
intoxicated that he did not or could not harbor malice. There 
is thus no substantial evidence of diminished capacity to 
support a voluntary manslaughter instruction on that theory. 
[3] Defendant claims that ~t was prejudicial error to" 
admit evidence that he had stolen the station wagon and the 
license plates on it. He asserts that there was abundant evi-
dence to connect him with the station wagon and that it was 
needlessly prejudicial to introduce evidence that he had stolen 
the car and its plates. Such proof, however, was relevant- not 
only to connect defendant with the car, but as evidence of his 
plan, motive, and intent throughout the night of the crime. It 
tended to rebut any inference that he abandoned the car 
because he was intoxicated, and it supported the prosecu-
tion's theory of robbery murder by indicating a plan to use a 
stolen vehicle to commit robberies. Accordingly the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence. (See 
Pfople v. McCaughan, 49 Ca1.2d 409, 421 [317 P.2d 974]; 
People v. Gonzales, 87 Cal..App~d 867, 877 [198 P.2d 81].) 
It is next contended that the trial court erred in allowing 
defendant to withdraw his plea of not guilty by reason of 
insanity without making an independent determination that 
he could intelligently withdraw the plea. The trial court 
determined that the withdrawal of the plea was voluntary. 
(See People v. Wein, 50 Ca1.2d 383, 408-409 [326 P.2d 
Apr. 1967] PEOPLE V. BANDHAuER 
[66 C.2d 524; 58 Cal.Rptr. 332. 426 P.2d 900) 
529 
457].) [4] Defendant was fully advised of his rights 
before he withdrew the plea, and he indicated that he had 
discussed the matter with his counsel. Since defendant had a 
psychiatric examination arranged for by his counsel before 
the plea was withdrawn, the trial court could properly assume 
that defendant's decision, arrived at with advice of counsel, 
was intelligently and voluntarily made. 
Defendant asserts that the district attorney was guilty of 
prejudicial misconduct in making statements to the jury that 
he believed in defendant's guilt and that he believed that 
defendant should be given the death penalty. [5] Counsel 
may vigorously argue his case and is not limited to "Chester-
fieldian politeness" (Ballard v. United States (9th Cir. 1945) 
152 F.2d 941, 943 (reversed on other grounds, 329 U.S. 187 
[91 L.Ed. 181, 67 S.Ct. 261]) ; People v. Nicolaus, 65 Ca1.2d 
866, 880 [56 nal.Rptr. 635, 423 P.2d 787]; People v. 
Hardenbrook, 48 Ca1.2d 345, 352-353 [309 P.2d 424]), but he 
cannot overreach by stating his personal belief based on facts 
not in evidence. (People V. Love, 56 Ca1.2d 720, 730 [16 Cal. 
Rptr. 777, 17 Cal.Rptr. 481, 366 P.2d 33, 809].) \Ve find no 
violation of this rule at the trial on the issue of guilt. 
At the trial on the issue of penalty, however, the prosecutor 
in the guise of argument presented facts not in evidence. 
[Sa] From the outset of the trial, the prosecutor informed 
the jury that he was running for office and that as a public 
officer he bore a mantle of trust that required him to be fair. 
At the beginning of his argument on the issue of penalty he 
statcd : ". . . as I told you right from the start-there is only 
one person in this courtroom that is required to see that the 
defendant gets a fair trial anymore than I am, and that is t11(' 
judge." The prosecutor pointed out to the jury why he l)ad 
objected to the introduction of certain evidence, indicating 
that he thought that it might be damaging to defendant. 
[7a] Within a short time a·fter he had laid this foundati(JlI 
of his public responsibility he told the jury: "During the 
many many years that I have been prosecutor, I have spell 
some pretty depraved character [sic]. Usually th(~y are kin(l 
of ·old because it takes a little while to become this depraved. 
But it has seldom been my misfortune to see a more deprave 
[sic] character than this one." Further along in his argu-
ment the prosecutor told the jury: ". . . I have stood before 
this court on occasions and recommended life imprisonment in 
first degree murder cases .... " The statement that defend-
ant was one of the most depraved characters that the prose-
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eutor had seen was testimonial. It was not related to the 
evidence in the case and was not subject to cross-examination. 
It presented to the jury an external standard by which to :fix 
the penalty based on the prosecutor's long experience. The 
error was aggravated by the prosecutor's telling the jury that 
he would recommend life imprisonment in a proper case, for 
he thus made clear that his request for the death penalty was 
based on his personal judgment and belief. (See State v. 
Horr, 63 Utah 22, 46 [221 P. 867] ; Levin and Levy, Persuad-
ing the Jury, 105 U.Pa.L.Rev. 139, 156.) 
rrhe Attorney General contends that since there was no 
objection, this issue cannot be raised on appeal. [6p] The 
argument on the public responsibility of the prosecutor was 
not by itself subject to objection. [7b] The testimonial 
statements were injected gradually into the argument so that 
it was not until the prosecutor made the clinching assertion 
that he· had seldom seen a more depraved character that 
grounds for objection were apparent. It was then too late to 
cure the error by admonition, and any effort of the prosecutor 
to cure the error by formally retracting what he obviously 
believed would only l~ave compounded it. Under these circum. 
stances defendant is not precluded from raising the issue for 
the first.time on appeal. (People v. Love, supra, 56 Ca1.2d 720, 
733.) It is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to 
defendant would have been reached in the absence of the 
prosecutor 's presentin~ to the jury facts not in evidence. 
(Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13;* People v. Hines, 61 Ca1.2d 164, 
169 [37 Cal.Rptr. 622, 390 P.2d 398] ; People v. Hamilton, 60 
CaI.2d 105,136-137 [32 Cal.Rptr. 4,383 P.2d 412].) 
Two questions remain that may arise on retrial. 
Defendant contends that in the argument at the trial on the 
issue of penalty, the prosecution should not have been allowed 
two arguments when the defendant had only one. We have 
previously held on the basis of the analogy to the practice at 
the trial on the issue of guilt that the prosecution may also 
open and close the argument at the trial on the issue of 
penalty. (People v. Love, supra, 56 Ca1.2d 720, 725; People v. 
Oonzales, 56 Cal.2d 317, 319 r14 Cal. Rptr. 639, 363 P.2d 871J ; 
People v. Corwin, 52 Ca1.2d 404, 407 [340 P.2d 626] ; see Pen. 
Code, § 1093. subd. 5.) Upon further consideration, however, 
we have concluded that the analogy to the trial on the issue of 
guilt should not control the practice on the issue of penalty. 
[8] The prosecutor's burden of proving guilt beyond a 
*Reporter's Note: Amendment adopted November 8, 1966. 
._ .... -..... -
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reasonable doubt at the trial on the issue of guilt justifies his 
closing the argument as well as opening it. At the trial on the 
issue of penalty, however, neither side has the burden of 
proving that one or the other penalty is the proper one in the 
case at hand, and there is no logical reason to favor one side 
over the other in argument. Equal opportunity to argue is 
also consistent with the Legislature's strict neutrality in 
governing the jury's choice of penalty. (People v. Green, 47 
Cal.2d 209,217-232 [302 P.2d 307].) [9] Although we are 
of the opinion that there is no reasonable probability that the 
sequence of closing argument alone would affect the result 
(Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13 j. People v. lVatson, 46 Cal.2d 818, 
836 [299 P.2d 243]), we believe that scrupulous regard for 
complete impartiality and fairness dictates that the extent of 
the argument on each side at the trial on the issue of penalty 
should be equal and that each side should have an oppor-
tunity to rebut the argument of the other. Accordingly, here-
after the prosecution should open and the defense respond. 
The prosecution may then argue in rebuttal and the defense 
close in surrebuttal. 
Defendant contends that the court excused jurors for cause 
without adequately establishing that their views with respect 
to the death penalty disqualified them. The questions asked by 
the court were somewhat ambiguous and further elucidation 
might have revealed that some of the jurors who were excused 
merely had doubts with respect to the death penalty. 
[10] Such doubts are not sufficient to disqualify a juror so 
long as he conscientiously believes that he could return a death 
penalty verdict in a proper case. (People v. Nicolaus, supra, 
65 Cal.2d 866, 882; People v. Smith, 63 Cal.2d 779, 789 [48 
Cal.Rptr. 382, 409 P.2d 222] ; People v. Gilbert, 63 Cal.2d 690, 
712 [47 Cal.Rptr. 909, 408 P.2d 365].) What constitutes a 
proper case is, of course, for the juror to decide. 
The judgment is reversed insofar as it relates to penalty. In 
all other respects, it is affirmed. 
Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., and Sullivan, J., concurred. 
PETERS, J.-I agree with the majority that reversible 
error was committed in the penalty trial, and so I agree with 
the reversal of the penalty judgment. But I dissent from tlIe 
majority opinion insofar as it affirms the determination of 
-Reporter's Note: Amendment adopted November 8, 1966. 
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guilt. I believe that there was some evidence of intoxication, 
and that defendant was therefore entitled to a manslaughter 
instruction based on the concept of diminished responsi-
bility. 
The law on this point is well settled. It is not whether there 
was "substantial" evidence to support the defense of dimin-
ished capacity, as stated by the majority, but whether there 
was "any" evidence, no matter how "weak" or "incredi-
ble" to support that defense. These principles were summa-
rized in People v. Oarmen, 36 Ca1.2d 768,at page 773 [228 
P.2d 281], where it was said: "Section 1127 of the Penal 
Code provides: '. . . The court shall inform the jury in all 
cases that the jurors are the exclusive judges ot all questions 
of fact submitted to them and of the credibility of the 
witnesses.' (Emphasis added.) It has been held that a 
defendant is entitled to instructions on his theory of the case 
as disclosed by the evidence, no matter how weak. As so ably 
'stated in People v. Burns, 88 Cal.App.2d 867, 871 [200 P.2d 
134], with ample citation of authority: 'It is elementary that 
the court should instruct the jury upon every material ques-
tion upon which there i.~ any evidence deserving of any 
consideration whatever. (People v. iQuimby, 6 Cal.App. 482, 
486 [92· P~ 493] ; People v. Foster, 79 Cal.App. 328, 337 [249 
P. 231]; People v. Hill, 76 Cal.App.2d 330, 343 [173 P.2d 
26].) The fact that the evidence may not be of a character to 
inspire belief does not authorize the refusal of °an instructio'n 
based thereon. (People v. Perkins, 75 Cal.App.2d 875, 881 
f171 P.2d 919] ; People v. Peete, 54 Cal.App. 333, 356, 359 
[202 P. 51] ; People v. lVong lIing, 176 Cal. 699, 705-706 [169 
P: ~57].) TJlat is a question within the exclusive province of 
the jury. IIowet'er incredible the testimony of a defendant 
may be he is entitled to an 1'nsfr'ltction based upon the 
hypothesis that it is entirely true. (People v. Perkins, supra, 
p. 881; People v. lVilliamson,6 Cal.App. 336, 339 [92 P. 313] ; 
People v. Keefer, 65 Cal. 232, 234 [3 P. 818].) ... ' " 
This principle has bren reaffirmed on many occasions. In 
People v. Modesto, 59 Ca1.2d 722 [31 Ca1.Rptr. 225, 382 P.2d 
33], Oa.rmen was not only reaffirmed but it was held that if 
the instruction should have been given failure to give it waR 
per se reversible. (See also People v. Oonley, 64 Ca1.2d 310 
[ 49 Cal.Rptr. 815, 411 P.2d 911].) 
In the instant case there was some evidence, perhaps weak, 
and prrhaps not very ('ollvincing', that drfc'ndant was under 
the influence of alcohol sufficient to affect his judgment when 
) 
) 
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the crimes were committed. As the majority opinion correctly 
discloses, defendant was in the company of Smith and Thomas 
from 8 p.m. until about 2 a.m. The evidence is uncontradicted 
that all were drinking during this period. Smith was so 
visibly drunk that several bars refused to serve him any more 
drinks. While the evidence is that defendant was not visibly 
intoxicated there is evidence, referred to by the majority, thnt 
defendant" was not seen to have had more than six or seven 
beers. " Thus he was observed to have had at least six or 
seven beers. If each bottle contained a pint of beer that would 
mean defendant consumed at least three and one-half quarts, 
or nearly a gallon, in less than six hours. If each glass 
contained only 10 ounces that would equal 70 ounces, or 
substantially over two quarts. The majority necessarily hold 
that, as a matter of law, that quantity of beer could not have 
affected the judgment of defendant. In so holding the 
majority are, in my opinion, improperly weighing the eYi-
dence, refusing to indulge in possible inferences in favor of 
defendant, and setting themselves up as experts in the field of 
alcoholism. There is, of course, substantial evidence that 
defendant did not appear affected by his consumption of the 
liquor, but the point is that there is some evidence to support 
an inference that he had consumed enough liquor so that his 
judgment could have been affected. There certainly is some 
evidence "no matter how weak" to support such an inference 
and to bring this case within the ambit of the rule requiring 
an instruction on dhninished responsibility. 
BURKE, J.-I concur in the affirmance of the judgment as 
to guilt but dissent from the reversal of the judgmeJ;1t as to 
penalty. 
,The majority hold that a few isolated remarks of the prose-
cutor selected out of his closing arguments that extend over 
35 pages of transcript require reversal of the judgment as to 
penalty even though at the trial no objection was made to the 
remarks. Most of the 35 pages of the prosecutor's arguments 
concerned matters such as the brutal nature of the killing, the 
fact that defendant "emptied this gun into [his victim's] 
body, some from the back and some from the front," defend-
ant's long history of criminal and other antisocial conduct, 
and his repeated failures to take advantage of opportunities 
given him to rehabilitate himself. At one place alone in the 
argument the prGspcutor stated, "During the many years that 
I have been a prosecutor, I have seen some pretty depraved 
/~-)-;..- '--'" 
, 
"'.----
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character [sic]. Usually they are kind of old because it takes a 
little while to become this depraved., But it has seldom been 
my misfortune to see a more depravec [sic] character than 
this one. If Mr. 'Valter Ashley Smith has forfeited his right 
to live at the hands of Mr. Bandhauer, I don't think that we 
should be' particularly upset about Mr. Bandhauer now 
having to forfeit his life for the life that he has led in the 
past few years. It is not a very equal trade, is it t" 
Subsequently the prosecutor stated, "I can readily see in 
some cases of first degree murder-and I have stood before 
this court on occasions and recommended life imprisonment in 
first degree murder eases-for example," and the prosecutor 
went on to state two examples of ca~es where the death 
penalty might not be justified: the first, a crime of passion 
where one spouse was found in a compromising position by 
the other spousc; and, the other, a crime in which the particu-
lar participant took no active part in a robbery and murder, 
except to drive the getaway car and had told his partner not 
to use a loaded gun because he did not want to be involved in 
any killing. The prosecutor then stated that in the instant· 
case "You don't have; just a trigger man. You have a 
vicious, cold-blooded killer here. This man wanted to make 
sure Mr.:Walter Ashley Smith was dead. There was only one 
reason for that-so he couldn't get on this witness stand and 
tell us what happened. This man has had enough of State 
Prison and didn't want to go back, and the one man who 
could send him back ... [was] Mr. Walter Ashley Smith." 
In Peop(,e v. Lopez, 60 Ca1.2d 223, 251-252 [32 Cal.Rptr. 
424, 384 P.2d 16], which affirmed judgments imposing the 
death penalty, this court unanimously held that a statement 
by the prosecutor "that he had never seen a more cold-blooded 
killing" was a proper argument at the penalty trial. The 
prosecutor in Lopez had not taken the stand to testify, and 
this court apparently was of the view that the quoted state-
ment was not to be interpreted literally but rather was merely 
a way of saying that the killing was an extremely cold-
blooded one, a fact fully warranted by the evidence. The 
prosecutor's statement in Lopez is similar to the prosecutor's 
statement here that defendant was one of the most depraved 
characters that the prosecutor had seen. If the instant state-
ment were construed as merely an assertion that defendant 
was extremely depraved, the argument is not improper since 
the evidence fully justifiNl such an assertion. (People v. 
Terry, 57 Cal.2d 538, 561 [21 Cal.Rptr. 185, 370 P.2d 985] j 
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People v. lVein, 50 Ca1.2d 383, 395-396 [326 P .2d 457].) There 
was evidence that defendant robbed and intentionally killed 
the decedent by firing six bullets into the victim's body 
including one that entered his heart and that defendant shot 
the decedent from the back as well as the front. The evidence 
also showed that defendant has a juvenile court record, was 
dishonorably discharged from the armed services, and has 
been convicted of various crimes including receiving stolen 
property, forgery, and escape from a county farm. 
Even if the prosecutor's statements pointed to by the 
majority were improper, defendant may not now complain 
since he made no objection at the trial. Had one been made, 
the trial court could easily have removed any harmful effect 
of the remarks by instructing the jury to disregard them. 
(People v. Jackson, 59 Cal.2d 375, 381 [29 Cal.Rptr. 505, 379 
P.2d 937] ; People v. Brice, 49 Ca1.2d 434, 437 [317 P.2d 961] ; 
People v. Hampton, 47 Cal.2d 239, 240-241 [302 P.2d 300].) 
Moreover, the remarks of the prosecutor referred to by the 
majority are but a minor portion of his arguments, and at the 
close of the arguments the jury was instructed that it should 
not consider as evidence any statement made by counsel 
during the trial unless such statement is made as an admis-
sion or stipulation conceding the existence of a fact or facts 
and that the jury should decide the case solely upon thc evi-
dence presented to it and the instructions given by the court. 
Under the circumstances any error in the arguments in ques-
tion was not prejudicial under article VI, section 13, of our 
Constitution .. (People v. lVilson, 60 Ca1.2d 139, 156 [32 
Cal.Rptr. 44, 383 P.2d 452] ; People v. Pike, 58 Ca1.2d 70, 96 
[22 Cal.Rptr. 664, 372 P.2d 656] ; People v. Garner, 57 Ca1.2d 
135, 156 [18 Cal.Rptr. 40, 367 P.2d 680] ; People v. Lane, 56 
Ca1.2d 773, 787 [16 Cal.Rptr. 801, 366 P.2d 57].) 
I would affirm the judgment in its entirety. 
McComb, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied May 24, 
1967. Peters, J., was of the opinion that the petition sllOuld 
be granted. 
